

Two Ways to Existentially Close a Proposition*

Jack Rabinovitch
Harvard University

1. Introduction

There is a cross-linguistic tendency to distinguish root clauses, those which may exist independent of other clauses in an utterance, and embedded clauses, which are only grammatical when embedded within a root clause. An idealized distinction between root and embedded clauses is often recognized as such: root clauses carry discourse markers, allow fronting of arguments, and allow hosting of certain moods, such as the imperative in English; embedded clauses are typically marked with a complementizer, contain less material than root clauses, and may host their own unique verbal forms. However, this distinction has been called into question as many languages occasionally embed clauses which exhibit so-called root phenomena (embedded root phenomena, or ERP) or have so-called embedded phenomena appear as independent clauses (insubordination). While ERP and insubordination are restricted to certain constructions, it is unclear if the mechanism that causes these restrictions is a syntactic one, a semantic one, or both.

This paper presents an account of embedded and root clauses whereby a CP contains an open proposition argument which requires existential closure. Adopting a Kratzerian approach, typical embedded clauses existentially close their propositional argument after being assigned to a contentful object, an (often unvocalized) entity-type argument, via a complementizer. Without complementizers, root clauses existentially close their propositional argument after assigning it a given illocutionary force, resulting in a speech act. Lexical items such as discourse markers are restricted to root clauses as they are speech act-taking predicates.

In Section 2, I argue that the application of illocutionary force to a proposition is a form of existential closure which relates said proposition to a speech act. This mirrors the structure of interfacing heads between sortal domains as proposed by Ramchand and Svenonius (2014), whereby the *vP*, *TP*, and *CP* domains are host to modifiers of event, situation, and proposition sortal types respectively. I take Force^o as the interface between the propositional CP and the speech act domain, a domain above the CP first proposed by Speas and Tenny (2003) (henceforth S&T (2003)). Force- and complementizer-mediated closure result in different syntactic-semantic structures, leading to a dichotomy in their distribution and use.

Under this framework, ERP can be analyzed as cases where embedded CPs have force-mediated closure. In Section 3, I use Suñer (1993)'s force-based analysis of Spanish embedded speech acts to argue that Spanish '*que*' can assign speech-act content to entity-type objects, in a manner similar to but distinct from complementizers. This allows speech acts, along with their root syntactic structure,

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to embed under verbs. In Section 4, I extend this analysis to insubordination with the addition of either covert predication, or object-taking discourse markers. In Section 5, I discuss the shortcomings of this theory in explaining Germanic embedded verb second (EV2). In line with Djärv (2019), I argue that German ERP does not involve force-mediated closure, and is an entirely CP-internal phenomenon, suggesting that ERP may be two phenomena, split across propositional and speech act domains.

2. Force as Existential Closure

In this section, I aim to provide a theory of root and embedded clause phenomena whereby root clauses represent speech acts and typical embedded clauses represent propositions. In order to do so, we must first distinguish speech acts from propositions. Since Searle (1969), speech acts have often been analyzed as ‘turns’ in a communicative game. While propositions are evaluated of worlds and are thus truth conditional, speech acts are actions in the world which provide force to propositions, typically asserting their truth, or asking for their confirmation. In this way, speech acts are often analyzed as a combination of ‘sentence radical,’ typically a proposition, and some form of illocutionary force, which transforms the proposition into a speech act.

- (1) a. Proposition: $\llbracket \text{I am hungry} \rrbracket = \lambda w. \text{I am hungry in } w$
 b. Speech act: $\llbracket \text{FORCE} \rrbracket (\llbracket \text{I am hungry} \rrbracket) = \text{ASSERT}(\text{I am hungry in } w^*)$

Rizzi (1997) codifies this in the syntax as ForceP, which is defined as an interface between a sentence and the discourse. Under S&T (2003) and Hill (2007), speech acts are given their own syntactic domain with their own unique cartography, hosting speech act adverbials such as ‘frankly’ and ‘honestly’. In these models, Force (or Sentience for S&T 2003) is not the most peripheral part of a sentence, but is only an interface between the truth-conditional propositional domain and discourse-related speech-act domain. Under these and similar frameworks, the implementation of illocutionary force type shifts propositions into speech acts; for Krifka (2001), Force^o is analyzed as a type shifter $\langle \langle s, t \rangle, a \rangle$, where $\langle s, t \rangle$ represents propositions and a represents (speech) acts.

Placing Force^o as a type shifter within a clause has the consequence of dividing the left periphery into two distinct ontological regions. We would predict that cross-linguistically, lexical items which modify propositions (and thus affect truth conditions) would not be able to generate above ForceP, while lexical items that modify speech acts would be unable to embed below ForceP. This prediction is borne out through observations that Hill (2007) makes regarding the cross-linguistic distribution of discourse particles and vocatives, which do not effect truth conditions and are restricted to the far left (or right) periphery; for example, the distribution of ‘alas’ in English (2). Note that Hill (2007) distinguishes these from interjections, which can appear anywhere in a sentence.

- (2) (Alas,) I (*alas) fear (*alas) that (*alas) he (*alas) has (*alas) already (*alas) left (?alas).

This distinction lends itself well to other far-left peripheral phenomena, such as evidentials. In many languages, evidentials are said to not affect the truth conditions of a sentence, failing dissent tests. In Cuzco Quechua, one cannot explicitly challenge the evidential force of a sentence (3).

- (3) a. *Inés-qa qaynunchay ñaña-n-ta-s watuku-sqa.*
 Inés-TOP yesterday sister-3-ACC-REP visit-PST2
 ‘Inés visited her sister yesterday’
EVIDENCE: speaker was told that Inés visited her sister yesterday

- b. *Mana-n chiqaq-chu. Manta-n-ta-lla-n watuku-rqa-n.*
 not-DIR true-NEG mother-3-ACC-LIM-DIR visit-PST1-3
 ‘That’s not true. She only visited her mother.’
- c.# *Mana-n chiqaq-chu. Mana-n chay-ta willa-rqa-sunki-chu.*
 not-DIR true-NEG not-DIR this-ACC tell-PST1-3S2O-NEG
 ‘That’s not true. You were not told this.’ [Cuzco Quechua; Faller 2002:195-196]


Faller (2002) argues that evidentials affect illocutionary force, modifying sincerity conditions rather than truth conditions. While a proposition is true when it accurately represents the world of evaluation, “[a] performance of an illocutionary act is sincere when the speaker has the mental state that he expresses in the performance of that act and it is insincere otherwise” (Vanderveken 1990:117). We can explain this as a split of our two ontological domains: the propositional domain, which is concerned with truth conditions, and the speech act domain, which is concerned with sincerity conditions. Thus evidentials are speech act modifiers rather than proposition modifiers.

Following Corr (2016), I denote the syntactic projections of these domains as the CP for propositions, and the Utterance Phrase (UP) for speech acts, though I differ in where the boundary between UP and CP is placed. Evidentials, evaluatives, and the split Speech Act Phrase all modify speech-acts, and are thus placed in UP. Force^o type shifts between propositions and speech acts, and as a result shouldn’t be stackable. Thus, I place Force^o as a single interfacing head (with a non-split phrasal projection) in Corr (2016)’s DeclP, where the DECLARATIVE feature (an illocutionary force) is located. This may be compared to the analyses of S&T (2003), and Corr (2016) in (4).¹


	[SAHighP	[SALowP	[EvalP	[EvidP	[DeclP	[TopP	...
(4) S&T (2003)	SAP		SentienceP		CP		...
Corr (2016)	UP		ForceP (in CP)			CP	...
This Paper		UP			ForceP	CP	...

The ontologically driven distinction between the CP and UP mirrors Ramchand and Svenonius (2014)’s approach to the ν P, TP, and CP domains. Under their framework, the ν P, TP, and CP domains are distinguished from one another by the ontological sort modified within each domain. Events are represented and modified in the ν P, situations (elaborations of events) in the TP, and propositions (elaborations of situations) in the CP. The strict cross-linguistic hierarchy of head-placement across these domains is a result of the strict cognitive hierarchy of these sorts. Each syntactic domain is separated from others via interfacing heads, which introduce a higher sort, relate the higher sort to the lower sort (through the relation ASP for aspect between events and situations, and through the relation FIN for finiteness between situations and propositions), and existentially close the lower sort so that it may not be modified higher in the structure. This can be seen in (5), where the interfacing head Asp^o introduces a situation argument, relates an event to that situation via the relation ASP, and existentially closes the event argument of the verb it takes as its complement. AspP may then combine with a situation-modifying T^o.

¹ For S&T (2003), DeclP is EpisP; see Hill (2007) for a discussion on the distinction between SAHighP and SALowP.



Rather than using Krifka (2001)'s treatment of analyzing Force° as of type $\langle \langle s, t \rangle, a \rangle$, we can extend the model given by Ramchand and Svenonius (2014), treating speech acts as an elaboration of propositions, where Force° is the interfacing head which relates propositions to speech acts (6).



Under this framework speech acts are an additional sortal type in the clausal 'spine', and thus we expect their syntactic and semantic behavior to be parallel to that of events, situations, and propositions. Just as tense markers such as PAST are situation-taking predicates generated in T° , discourse markers, evidentials, and evaluatives are act-taking predicates generated in U° , and are built compositionally into a sentence's derivation. Take, for instance, the sentence 'Alas, it is raining,' which consists of a proposition, an assertive force, and the discourse marker 'alas' (7a). Building the proposition via Ramchand and Svenonius (2014)'s existential closure of sortal domains (ASP and FIN), we can define the proposition 'it is raining' in (7b).

ASSERT is a type of Force° which denotes a force relation, which we define as $\text{FOR}_{\text{Assert}}$ (7c). For Faller (2002), assertive force creates a sincerity condition which is judged as sincere if the speaker believes that the proposition is true, though the strict sincerity conditions of ASSERT may differ based on one's theory of choice. ASSERT applies to the proposition through function application, existentially closing the proposition p and opening an act argument a (7d). 'Alas' may be understood as an act-taking predicate which restricts the sincerity condition such that it is sincere only if the speech act is uttered to express sadness (7e). Both with open act arguments, 'alas' and our ForceP can combine through predicate modification (7f). The resulting sentence carries the truth conditions of being true if it is raining, and the sincerity conditions that the speaker believes that it is raining and is expressing their sadness through that speech act.

- (7) a. $[\text{UP Alas}, [\text{ForceP ASSERT} [\text{CP it is raining}]]]$
 b. $\llbracket \text{it is raining} \rrbracket = \lambda p \exists s \exists e. \text{FIN}(p, s) \wedge \text{ASP}(s, e) \wedge \text{rain}(e)$

- c. $\llbracket \text{ASSERT} \rrbracket = \lambda P \lambda a \exists p. \text{FOR}_{\text{Assert}}(a, p) \wedge P(p)$
d. $\llbracket \text{ASSERT} \rrbracket (\llbracket \text{it is raining} \rrbracket) = \lambda a \exists p \exists s \exists e. \text{FOR}_{\text{Assert}}(a, p) \wedge \text{FIN}(p, s) \wedge \text{ASP}(s, e) \wedge \text{rain}(e)$
e. $\llbracket \text{alas} \rrbracket = \lambda a. \text{SAD}(a)$
f. $\llbracket \text{alas, it is raining} \rrbracket = \lambda a \exists p \exists s \exists e. \text{SAD}(a) \wedge \text{FOR}_{\text{Assert}}(a, p) \wedge \text{FIN}(p, s) \wedge \text{ASP}(s, e) \wedge \text{rain}(e)$

In addition to matrix contexts where a proposition is closed by an illocutionary force, propositions are often embedded under attitude verbs. For Kratzer (2006) and Moulton (2009), attitude verbs are unable to directly select proposition type arguments, and instead take entity-type arguments. For embedding under attitude verbs to happen, a complementizer fulfills the role of relating the embedded proposition p to an entity-type argument x , which may then be selected as an argument by a verb. Propositions are related to entities by a compatibility relation (8a). Under Kratzer (2006), a complementizer COMP may be understood as a two place predicate (8b). Assuming that CPs have open proposition arguments rather than being propositions themselves, COMP can be redefined as (8c), mirroring the structure of Ramchand and Svenonius (2014)'s relational heads.

- (8) a. $\text{COMP}(x, p) = \forall w' [\text{compatible}(x, w') \rightarrow p(w') = 1]$
b. $\llbracket \text{COMP} \rrbracket = \lambda p \lambda x. \text{COMP}(x, p)$
c. $\llbracket \text{COMP} \rrbracket = \lambda P \lambda x \exists p. \text{COMP}(x, p) \wedge P(p)$

Rather than providing an open act argument a , the complementizer provides an open entity argument x . Thus, instead of being closed by Force° , the CP in (7b) can instead undergoes function application by the complementizer 'that' to become verb-embeddable (9).

- (9) $\llbracket \text{that it is raining} \rrbracket = \lambda x \exists p \exists s \exists e. \text{COMP}(x, p) \wedge \text{FIN}(p, s) \wedge \text{ASP}(s, e) \wedge \text{rain}(e)$

Complementizers and illocutionary force both close the proposition argument of a CP, and as a result, the two operators cannot be stacked. Along with the fact that complementizers (overt or silent) are ever-present cross-linguistically, the mutual exclusivity of CP complementation and UP structure may be a large determiner in what is considered 'root' phenomena and what is considered 'embedded' phenomena, as lexical items restricted to the UP and movement into UP structure are both unavailable under complementizer headed clauses. This extension of Ramchand and Svenonius (2014)'s theory into speech acts allows us to analyze the difference between root and embedded clauses as a byproduct of the presence or absence of speech act semantics and its accompanying syntactic structure. In the next section, we will see that while complementizers in the sense of (8), cannot embed speech acts, some languages do have strategies for embedding speech acts and UP structure, resulting in ERP.

3. Embedded Root Phenomena as Act Embedding

Because UP structure allows root phenomena, the embedding of UPs can lead to so-called embedded root phenomena (ERP). Such is the case in Spanish reportative constructions, where question speech acts are embedded via the word '*que*'. The embedded clause in (10a) is what Suñer (1993) terms a semi-question, which are propositional, and may be evaluated for truth conditions. As a result, the sentence (10a) is interpreted as Juan saying the list of people such that when those people replace the *wh*-word in the proposition, the proposition is true (i.e. who is coming: Pedro, María, and Pablo). The

embedded clause in (10b) is a full question, a speech act with its own (questioning) force, and thus the sentence (10b) describes Juan's request for information.

- (10) a. *Juan dijo [quién venía]*.
 Juan said who come-PST
 'Juan said who was coming.'
 b. *Juan dijo [**que** quién venía]*.
 Juan said that who come-PST
 'Juan said: who was coming?' [Spanish; modified from Etxepare 2010:618]

This phenomenon is not direct quotation; third person pronouns may undergo binding and embedded first- and second-person pronouns and agreement are evaluated in the context of utterance (11).²

- (11) *Los prisioneros repitieron **que adónde** los llevábamos.*
 the prisoners repeated that where CLT.3PL taking-1PL
 'The prisoners_i repeated: where were we_s taking them_i?'
 [Spanish; modified from Suñer 1993:69]

The presence of 'que' before the *wh*-occupied SpecCP is typically analyzed as resulting from a double CP projection. Rather than the addition of a second CP to host 'que', we can analyze this as the addition of a UP, with 'que' generated in a U° position, namely, as Corr (2016) argues, Evid°.³

- (12) a. [UP *Juan dijo* [CP *quién venía.*]]
 b. [UP *Juan dijo* [UP *que* [CP *quién venía.*]]]

Assuming that verbs only take entity arguments, we can surmise that 'que' functions to relate the embedded speech act to an entity. The Kratzerian approach has already given us a framework for relating entities to other ontological types, as seen in (8). Taking a closer look, the compatibility relation *compatible*(*x*, *w*) is true if the entity *x* refers to a proposition *p_x* which is true of world *w*. We derive *COMP*(*x*, *p*) as true if *p* is true of all the worlds where *p_x* is true. While propositions have truth-conditions evaluated across worlds, we can understand speech acts as having sincerity-conditions evaluated across contexts, where a context includes information about the speaker, addressee, time, world, and location. Using this, I propose that in addition to compatibility relations between entities and worlds, we may also have suitability relations between entities and contexts. The suitability relation *suitable*(*x*, *c*) is true if the entity *x* refers to an act *a_x* which is sincere (denoted *S*) in the context *c*. We can derive *SUIT*(*x*, *a*) as true if *a* is sincere in all the contexts where *a_x* is sincere (13a). I present a definition of 'que' both in a Kratzerian form without existential closure (13b) and in a format compatible with our adopted Ramchand and Svenonius (2014) framework (13c).⁴

² Note that 'repitieron' can take either propositions or speech acts like 'dijo' in (10); compare with verbs like 'preguntar' (ask/wonder) which embed only propositional semi-questions.

³ The syntactic justification of this is that reportative 'que' can embed illocutionary force (above DeclP) but not vocatives (below SALowP). Semantically, reportative 'que' behaves similarly to other evidentials cross-linguistically, suggesting its place in Evid° rather than Eval°.

⁴ Although I transfer a Kratzerian framework of propositional complementizers to their speech-act equivalent, as far as I can tell, there is no theoretical issue with analyzing suitability relations as a part of speech act-taking verb rather than of lexical items like 'que'.

- (13) a. $\text{SUIT}(x, a) = \forall c' [\text{suitable}(x, c') \rightarrow a(c') = \mathbb{S}]$
 b. $\llbracket \text{que} \rrbracket = \lambda a \lambda x. \text{SUIT}(x, a)$
 c. $\llbracket \text{que} \rrbracket = \lambda P \lambda x \exists a. \text{SUIT}(x, a) \wedge P(a)$

As a result, ‘*que*’ relates an act *a* to an entity *x* such that *x* represents an act *a_x* with the same sincerity conditions as *a*. For example, the imperative ‘*hicieran su propio*’ in (14a) is embedded under a verbum dicendi via ‘*que*’. I define the imperative as a speech act containing a proposition with a commanding force, with the sincerity condition that the speaker wants the proposition to be made true by the addressee (14b). I define ‘*dijo*’ as a Davidsonian verb with an event- and entity-type argument.

- (14) a. *Juan dijo que hicieran su propio.*
 Juan say that do-SBJV 2.POSS task
 ‘Juan says: do your task.’
 b. $\llbracket \text{hicieran su propio} \rrbracket = \lambda a \exists p. \text{FOR}_{\text{Command}}(a, p) \wedge \text{you do your task}(p)$
 c. $\llbracket \text{que hicieran su propio} \rrbracket = \lambda x \exists a \exists p. \text{SUIT}(x, a) \wedge \text{FOR}_{\text{Command}}(a, p) \wedge \text{you do your task}(p)$
 d. $\llbracket \text{dijo que hicieran su propio} \rrbracket =$
 $\lambda e \exists x \exists a \exists p. \text{say}(e, x) \wedge \text{SUIT}(x, a) \wedge \text{FOR}_{\text{Command}}(a, p) \wedge \text{you do your task}(p)$
 e. $\llbracket \text{Juan dijo que hicieran su propio} \rrbracket =$
 $\lambda a' \exists p' \exists s \exists e \exists x \exists a \exists p. \text{FOR}_{\text{Assert}}(a', p') \wedge \text{FIN}(p', s) \wedge \text{ASP}(s, e) \wedge \text{AGENT}(e, \text{Juan}) \wedge$
 $\text{say}(e, x) \wedge \text{SUIT}(x, a) \wedge \text{FOR}_{\text{Command}}(a, p) \wedge \text{you do your task}(p)$

While (14b) denotes the speech act *a*, (14c) denotes an entity *x* with sincere-equivalent content *a_x*. Thus, (14e) denotes a speech act *a'* asserting a proposition that Juan said a speech act *a_x* with the same sincerity conditions as *a*. A benefit of this analysis is that the embedded act need not be verbatim: all it requires is that the sincerity conditions be equivalent to the original speech act to which it refers.

4. Acts without Force

While ERP represents cases of root-phenomena appearing in embedded contexts, insubordination represents cases of embedded-phenomena appearing in root contexts. This can be seen again in Spanish, where the reportative embedding ‘*que*’ may head a matrix clause (15a). Under our semantics so far, it would seem like this sentence is incomplete, as ‘*que*’ closes the speech act argument, creating an entity-taking predicate like in (14c). For Etxepare (2010), reportative ‘*que*’ heads a DP, resulting in an entity which undergoes predication via a (silently headed) small clause, becoming a proposition.⁵ The addition of predication over ‘*que*’ helps to explain the discrepancy between Spanish reportative constructions and other evidential reporting as noted by Etxepare (2010). As we have seen in (3), evidentials affect sincerity conditions but not truth conditions, and cannot be denied. In Spanish, while reportative ‘*que*’ encodes evidential meaning at Evid^o, it may still be denied in matrix clauses (15b).

- (15) a. (*Oye*,) *que el Athletic de Bilbao ha fichado a Ronaldinho.*
 listen that the Athletic Bilbao has recruited PREP Ronaldinho
 ‘(Listen,) Athletic Bilbao has got Ronaldinho.’
EVIDENCE: the speaker has been told that Athletic Bilbao got Ronaldinho

⁵ This proposition can then become a speech act via an additional application of FORCE.

- b. *Venga hombre, no te han dicho eso.*
 come.on man NEG CLT.2SG have told that
 ‘Come on, man, they didn’t tell you that.’ [Spanish; Etxepare 2010:612]

Interestingly, this is predicted by our semantics; while speech acts are not truth conditional, the relation *SUIT* is, as *SUIT*(*x*, *a*) is either true or false. Thus, while the illocutionary force of (14b) itself cannot be denied, whether or not the embedded speech act *a* accurately represents the sincerity conditions of the entity-referred speech act *a_x* can be. By including a suitability relation with a small-clause related predicate, or as Shimamura (2018) theorizes for a similar phenomenon in Japanese, a silent *verbum dicendi*, the sentence gains access to truth conditions regarding the sincerity conditions of the embedded UP.⁶ This is not the case in the Quechua sentence in (3a), where the speech act with reportative evidentiality is not embedded under a suitability relation.

Insubordination in Ibero-Romance goes further than reportatives, however. Corr (2016) notes that in addition to reportative constructions, ‘*que*’ may also be used for exclamative constructions, as shown by the Galician example in (16). Corr (2016) argues that exclamative ‘*que*’ is generated higher than *Evid*^o, in *SALow*^o, whose projection includes the site of vocatives. Thus, while ‘*que*’ may have a single entry within the UP domain, it may be generated at different heads within the UP.

- (16) *Ai que che parece que teño todo o día?!*
 DM EXCL to.you=seem.3SG that have.1SG all the day
 ‘Do you think I’ve got all day?!’ [Galician; modified from Corr 2016:89]

Exclamative ‘*que*’ is not embeddable under verbs (Corr 2016:101), suggesting that the *SALowP* is unembeddable under verbs in Ibero-Romance. If this is the case, then the silent small clause/*verbum dicendi* must be an exception to this restriction. Another possibility comes from the interesting nature of exclamatives in that they may not require propositional content. Searle (1969) argues for the existence of non-propositional sentence radicals for exclamations, such as (17a). In this case, there is no syntactic position for illocutionary force mediated by *Force*^o. Instead, the discourse particle itself may take an entity-type object (17b). Compositionally then, (17a) can be understood in (17c) as the stating of a speech act *a* with some (cheering) relation to Manchester United.

- (17) a. Hurrah for Manchester United!
 b. $\llbracket \text{Hurrah} \rrbracket = \lambda x \lambda a. \text{CHEER}(a, x)$
 c. $\llbracket \text{Hurrah} \rrbracket (\llbracket \text{Manchester United} \rrbracket) = \lambda a. \text{CHEER}(a, \text{Manchester United})$

With this, we can take ‘*ai*’ in (16) to be an integral part of the derivation: relating an entity to a speech act. We can define it by a relation *EXAS*, which I take to be some relation between acts and entities, with the sincerity condition that the act denotes exasperation at the entity. Thus, we no longer need a silent small clause or *verbum dicendi*; the discourse marker itself takes the entity-type UP argument.

- (18) a. $\llbracket ai \rrbracket = \lambda x \lambda a. \text{EXAS}(a, x)$
 b. $\llbracket che\ parece\ que\ teño\ todo\ o\ día \rrbracket = \lambda p. \text{you think I have all day}(p)$
 c. $\llbracket \text{EXCLAIM} \rrbracket (\llbracket (18b) \rrbracket) = \lambda a \exists p. \text{FOR}_{\text{Exclaim}}(a, p) \wedge \text{you think I have all day}(p)$

⁶ This is also the case for the embedded force in (14e), where a respondent can deny that whatever Juan said (*a_x*) had commanding force as it would result in *SUIT*(*x*, *a*) being false.

- d. $\llbracket que \llbracket (18c) \rrbracket \rrbracket = \lambda x \exists a \exists p. \text{SUIT}(x, a) \wedge \text{FOR}_{\text{Exclaim}}(a, p) \wedge \text{you think I have all day}(p)$
 e. $\llbracket ai \llbracket (18d) \rrbracket \rrbracket =$
 $\lambda a' \exists x \exists a \exists p. \text{EXAS}(a', x) \wedge \text{SUIT}(x, a) \wedge \text{FOR}_{\text{Exclaim}}(a, p) \wedge \text{you think I have all day}(p)$

This solution requires that some discourse markers be two place predicates rather than simple one place act-taking predicates. However, the benefit of this analysis is that we can make compositional sense out of exclamations which have sincerity conditions but no truth conditions, such as (17a).

5. A Spectrum of Roots

In addition to Ibero-Romance ERP, Germanic languages are well known to have ERP in the form of EV2, where verb-second order (typically analyzed as V-to-C movement) occasionally appears in embedded contexts. Since Hooper and Thompson (1973) (henceforth H&T (1973)), the common approach to this form of ERP is to argue that EV2, much like its root counterpart, contains the illocutionary force of assertion. This assertive force is part of the entire utterance, thus committing the speaker not only to the truth of the root clause proposition, but also to the truth of the embedded proposition. With illocutionary force as the CP-UP interface, this analysis effectively treats typical embedded clauses as propositional and EV2 clauses as speech acts.

Recent work on various Germanic languages has pushed back on this approach, however. In a survey of Northern Germanic languages, Wiklund et al. (2009) finds that while notions of assertion are associated with EV2, assertion itself cannot be used to discern V2 from non-V2 word orders in embedded contexts. Djärv (2019) argues that V-to-C movement is licensed by the embedded proposition's pragmatic status as discourse-new. Importantly, the ability of verbs to embed V2 is effected by negation, strongly suggesting that V2 complements are not syntactically selected for UP structure. Another major issue with a UP based approach to Germanic languages is that verbs often understood to be unable to embed (entities with) speech act content can embed V2; verbs of belief are unable to embed ERP in Spanish (Etxepare 2008), but are available for EV2 in German (Djärv 2019). These facts suggest that EV2, at least in German, does not include a UP layer.

Indeed, a strict H&T (1973) account also fails to represent the data in Ibero-Romance. In H&T (1973) a key point to ERP is not only that the embedded clause has assertive force, but necessarily that this force is interpreted as part of the force of the matrix clause. While this paper's analysis of Ibero-Romance ERP includes embedded force, the force of the embedded clause is not part of the force that the speaker is expressing, but rather is the force of the speech act which is referenced via the SUIT relation. Thus, the speaker of (11) is not themselves asking where the prisoners were taken, but is simply reporting the prisoners' question.

For Corr (2016), the availability of 'que' for various purposes across Ibero-Romance languages is caused by feature scattering or bundling. Feature scattering allows more heads for lexical generation and landing sites for movement. Thus, while Spanish and Galician allow reportative 'que' constructions, European Portuguese, which bundles its EVIDENTIAL and DECLARATIVE features on one head, does not. If Ibero-Romance ERP is caused by feature scattering in the UP domain, then feature scattering within the CP domain may be what causes EV2 in Germanic languages. Thus unified account of ERP may be found in feature scattering across both the CP and UP domains.

6. Conclusion

In this paper I have proposed an analysis of speech acts as a sortal domain in the same vein as

Ramchand and Svenonius (2014). This domain is represented by the syntactic projection of the Utterance Phrase, which is distinguished from the CP by the introduction of illocutionary force. Complementizers and illocutionary force are two ways to existentially close off propositions, causing complementizer based embedding to exhibit ‘embedded’ phenomena, and clauses with illocutionary force, most commonly seen in matrix clauses, to exhibit ‘root’ phenomena. However, UP embedding is possible, and can result in both ERP and insubordination, as is seen in Ibero-Romance languages. Finally, I discussed Germanic EV2, providing evidence that this form of ERP is constrained to the CP domain, and suggest that the feature scattering effects in the UP of Ibero-Romance may have a CP analogue responsible for EV2.

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